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NOTES

A Tax Analysis of the Emerging Class
of Hybrid Entities
INTRODUCTION
Jeffrey Hollender was ready for a change. He had made
a small fortune selling self-help courses, but he did not believe
in the work anymore.1 After an embarrassing appearance on
the Phil Donahue Show, where audience members took
Hollender to task for the apparent moral bankruptcy of his day
job, he began to search for a more meaningful way to spend his
life.2 Hollender gave up his job at Warner Communications,
took a good, long look in the mirror, and started putting
together a book called How to Make the World a Better Place.3
As Hollender was researching a chapter on the
environment, he stumbled across a small catalog called Renew
America that specialized in selling environmentally friendly
products.4 Intrigued, he got in touch with Renew America’s
owner, Alan Newman.5 As the two discussed the catalog,
Hollender began to see huge potential: the environmental
movement was really beginning to take off, but consumer
companies were barely addressing it.6 Before long, Hollender
convinced Newman to take him on as a partner and devoted
himself to aggressively expanding Renew America’s business.7
Within six years, Hollender had driven the company’s
annual earnings from $100,000 to $6,000,000. Anticipating a
1

See Joyce Marcel, Profiles in Business: Jeffrey Hollender and Seventh Generation,
VT. BUS. MAG. (June 1, 2003), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-349101541.html.
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
See id.
5
See id.
6
See id.
7
See id.
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change in the market, however, he sold the catalog and shifted
the company’s focus to developing environmentally friendly
products.8 At first, he cultivated relationships with natural
foods stores.9 But before long, he was able to persuade
traditional grocery stores to carry his products.10 As the business
continued to grow, Hollender decided that the company’s name
ought to reflect its commitment to sustainable products and living.11
After one of his employees introduced him to the Great Law of the
Iroquois Confederacy—“[i]n our every deliberation, we must
consider the impact of our decisions on the next seven
generations”12—Hollender renamed the company Seventh
Generation.13
Over the next fifteen years, Seventh Generation became
one of the leaders of an emerging group of businesses dedicated
to transforming consumer products.14 It also became a
registered B Corporation, a business mark that designates a
company’s commitment to social and environmental
standards.15 It is difficult to overstate the company’s impact on
the widespread availability of environmentally friendly
cleaning products. Seventh Generation was one of the earliest
environmentally focused companies to push its products into
ordinary supermarkets.16 By doing so, the company helped
move sustainable brands beyond a niche and into the
mainstream—turning a nascent market in environmentally
responsible goods into a profitable alternative to traditional
products.17 Seventh Generation’s cleaning products have also
had a major influence on its competitors. In 2010, Seventh
Generation finally persuaded the American Cleaning
Institute’s members to implement a voluntary ban on the use of
damaging phosphates in dishwater detergent—a major shift in
industry practice that water protectionists are lauding as an

8

See id.
See id.
10
See id.
11
See id.
12
Great Law of the Iroquois Confederacy, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 15, 2004),
http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/fast-company-staff/fast-company-blog/great-lawiroquois-confederacy.
13
Marcel, supra note 1.
14
Id.
15
B Corporation—Wave of the Future for Business, SEVENTH GENERATION,
http://www.seventhgeneration.com/learn/blog/b-corporation-wave-future-business (last
visited Oct. 12, 2012). See infra Part III.B for a detailed explanation of B Corporations.
16
Marcel, supra note 1.
17
Id.
9
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important step forward for the cleaning products industry.18
The company’s product line is also chlorine free, and the
strength of its sales has, in part, prompted traditional
competitors to begin offering their own chlorine-free products.19
Human-health and environmental-safety experts recognize this
movement away from chlorine as a substantial market
improvement.20
Despite
helping
to
develop
the
market
for
environmentally responsible cleaning products, leading its
competitors to improve the environmental quality of their
product lines, and making important contributions to the watersafety movement, Seventh Generation has never been eligible for
favorable federal tax incentives.21 As far as the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) is concerned, Seventh Generation is no different
from Tide, Cascade, or Clorox.22
This note considers whether the federal tax scheme for
companies like Seventh Generation is appropriate given the
benefits they appear to confer on society—an issue that is
increasingly more salient as an emerging business sector
known as “social enterprise”23 tests and pushes traditional
business boundaries. Social enterprise is characterized by
businesses that pursue a dual mission of achieving “social and
business goals together, viewing them as synergistic and
mutually reinforcing, as equal partners in their business
vision.”24 Hemmed in by traditional business entities like forprofit and nonprofit corporations, social entrepreneurs have
recently developed a handful of new business entities that
attempt to achieve at least three central goals: (1) articulate
and pursue a dual mission, (2) gain access to capital, and (3)
effectively brand dual-mission businesses.25 The hybrid entities
that are most commonly in use today are: the Low-Profit
Limited Liability Company (L3C), which is a socially oriented
18

Detergent Industry’s Landmark Voluntary Phosphate Ban Caps Seventh
Generation’s Decade-Long Fight, MARKETWIRE (June 29, 2010), http://www.marketwire.com/
press-release/detergent-industrys-landmark-voluntary-phosphate-ban-caps-seventhgenerations-decade-1283540.htm.
19
See, e.g., CLOROX, http://www.clorox.com/products (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
20
Medical Hazards of Chlorine, CHLORINE FREE PRODUCTS ASS’N,
http://chlorinefreeproducts.org/medicalhazardsofchlorine.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
21
See infra Part III.
22
See infra Part III.
23
Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437,
2450 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24
Id.
25
See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 610 (2011).
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variant of the traditional limited liability company that state
statutes enable companies to adopt; the Benefit Corporation (B
Corporation), which is a private designation offered by the
nonprofit organization B Lab to third-party organizations that
meet a set of qualifying criteria; and the statutory benefit
corporation, which is an alternative to the traditional for-profit
corporation that state statutes allow qualifying corporations to
adopt.26 While there is a healthy debate concerning whether
these three entities serve the core social enterprise goals, there
has been comparatively little scholarship concerning how they
should be taxed. This note helps to develop that discussion by
considering to what extent these so-called hybrid entities
qualify for favorable federal tax treatment under two
traditional theories for nonprofit tax advantages and also
under Professors Malani and Posner’s broader theory of
favorable taxation for socially beneficial activities.27 These
theories provide a helpful springboard for this conversation
because the core hybrid-entity goal of pursuing social good
stands in rough parallel to the socially beneficial objectives of
traditional nonprofits.
This note argues that while each of the three most
common American hybrid entities demonstrates some
characteristics that justify favorable tax treatment, they also
lack essential structural features that would warrant entitybased tax advantages. Part I offers a backdrop for the hybrid
entity’s development by introducing social enterprise and
briefly reviewing the corporation, the nonprofit corporation,
and the key challenges these forms present for businesses
interested in pursuing both public good and profit. Part II
explains how for-profit and nonprofit corporations are normally
taxed, introduces two traditional rationales for nonprofit tax
benefits, and describes Malani and Posner’s critique of the
current tax regime. Part III then presents the three hybrid
entities discussed above and considers to what extent they
address the core considerations of the traditional tax rationales
and Malani and Posner’s theory. This analysis highlights the
elements of each hybrid entity that support favorable tax
treatment. It also discusses those features that preclude or
impede federal tax advantages.

26

See infra Part III.
Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L.
REV. 2017, 2022 (2007).
27
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The social enterprise movement has developed over the
past two to three decades28 as entrepreneurs have created
businesses that use “earned income strategies” to “directly
address[] social need[s] . . . through [their] products and
services.”29 As such, the “social enterprise ideal”30 typically
involves blending traditional business methods31 with a “deep
and particular commitment to philanthropic endeavor.”32
Achieving this ideal requires the pursuit of the so-called double
bottom line, which contemplates both financial and social
success.33 Social enterprise has taken many shapes but
commonly fits within one of two models: (1) a profit-driven
entity that incorporates socially responsible business choices in
some elements of its decision making (a model that bears a
good deal of similarity to corporate social responsibility), or (2)
a social-value-driven entity that contemplates earning some
profits in its business activities.34
The theoretical underpinnings of social enterprise are,
at turns, intuitively appealing to the socially minded or
practically unsatisfying to the business traditionalist. But
whether one is a devotee or an agnostic about the wisdom,
value, and utility of social enterprise, its proponents have
identified characteristics of traditional business forms that
present something of a conundrum for social enterprise.35 As
such, social entrepreneurs and legal theorists have advocated
the development of new hybrid entities designed to obviate
these challenges and serve the dual-mission approach of social
enterprise.36 Before turning to the new entities, however, it is
28

See Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise
Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 342 (2009).
29
What is Social Enterprise, SOC. ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://www.sealliance.org/what-is-social-enterprise (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
30
Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2450.
31
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, supra note 29.
32
Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2450.
33
Kelley, supra note 28, at 339.
34
See id. at 351-52.
35
See id. at 363.
36
Id. at 340 (“According to [the proponents of social enterprise], we are in the
process of moving beyond the traditional conception of society as divided neatly into
three sectors—business, nonprofit, and government—and are witnessing the
emergence of a new fourth sector that encompasses elements of both the business and
nonprofit sectors.”).
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instructive to consider the traditional entity landscape from
which they emerge.
B.

The For-Profit Corporation

Given the current debate concerning whether new
hybrid entities are necessary to facilitate social enterprise, it is
interesting to note that the earliest corporations were not
organized for commercial activities.37 Instead, they were
incorporated for a variety of municipal, community, and
charitable purposes.38 Soon, however, the corporation became
the entity of choice for commercial business in America.39 As
market “demand grew for a form of business organization that
could amass and efficiently manage very large and longlived
capital investments,”40 legislators responded by gradually
endowing the corporation with three central components that
enabled it to serve this demand: (1) “the right to issue
transferable shares,” (2) delegation of shareholder power to
management, and (3) limited liability for shareholders.41 With
these features commonly in place, the corporation was able to
serve as the mechanism for capital growth and investment that
American business demanded.42
As the corporate form developed, so too did the theory of
shareholder primacy,43 which many social entrepreneurs and
legal theorists consider the largest obstacle to the dual mission
of social enterprise.44 Shareholder primacy theory stands for the
principle that the corporation’s primary fiduciary responsibility
is to maximize the value of the corporation for its
shareholders.45 “If pursuit of this objective conflicts with the
interests of one or more of the corporation’s nonshareholder
constituencies, management is to disregard such competing
37

MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 40 (2004).
Id.
39
Id.
40
William L. Baldwin, The Corporation and Society: An Evolutionary/Institutional
Approach, 27 VT. L. REV. 841, 843-44 (2003).
41
Id. at 844.
42
See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 37, at 150.
43
D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 296
(1998) (“[T]he shareholder primacy norm was not developed by courts until the 1830s,
but evidence of shareholder primacy is abundant in early business corporations. Early
corporate charters, general incorporation statutes, judicial decisions, and legal
commentary all reflect a commitment to shareholder primacy in the similar treatment
of dividends and voting rules.” (footnotes omitted)).
44
Kelley, supra note 28, at 351-52.
45
Smith, supra note 43, at 282.
38
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considerations.”46 This belief was articulated, perhaps most
famously, in the all-too-familiar case of Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., where the Supreme Court of Michigan found that “[a]
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end.”47 As stated in Dodge, the theory of
shareholder primacy became a legal hurdle for corporations
that sought to engage in activities expressly for the public good
rather than for shareholder value.48
In response to criticisms of the shareholder primacy
theory,49 many states have adopted a so-called constituency
statute, which “authorizes, but does not require, the board to
take into account the interests of stakeholders such as
employees, suppliers, the community, the environment, and
shareholders when determining a course of action or making a
decision.”50 Delaware, where most Fortune 500 corporations are
currently incorporated, does not have such a constituency
statute.51 But it does expressly authorize corporations to
“[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable,
scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or other
national emergency in aid thereof.”52 It is unclear, however, to
what extent these statutory provisions can facilitate the dual
missions of social enterprise. To consider this question, it is

46

Id.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
48
See generally Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can
Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?,
42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765 (2009). It is worth pointing out that the court’s statement on
shareholder primacy in Dodge was dicta. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching
Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 167 (2008). Moreover, Professor Stout argues
that the case can be read more profitably as holding that Henry Ford, as a controlling
shareholder, had breached his fiduciary duty of good faith to minority shareholders. See
id. While Dodge may not properly be read to articulate the theory of shareholder primacy,
it is the theory’s apocryphal root and, as its facts “are familiar to virtually every student
who has taken a course in corporate law,” id. at 164, it is a helpful heuristic.
49
Shareholder primacy theory actually developed into one of the more
contentious debates in corporate law’s history. Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the
Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 535 (2006). Since early debate
on the topic in the pages of the Harvard Law Review between Professors Berle and Dodd,
scholarship has continually questioned to what degree a corporation’s concerns should be
fixed to maximize shareholder value. See Smith, supra note 43, at 281-82; see also Marshall
M. Magaro, Two Birds, One Stone: Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility Through the
Shareholder-Primacy Norm, 85 IND. L.J. 1149, 1152-53 (2010).
50
Rakhi I. Patel, Facilitating Stakeholder-Interest Maximization:
Accommodating Beneficial Corporations in the Model Business Corporation Act, 23 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 135, 146 (2010).
51
See id. at 147.
52
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2011).
47
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useful to assess the range of activities that constituency
statutes have enabled.
C.

Corporate Social Responsibility

The prevalence of constituency statutes and similar
statutory provisions authorizing corporate donations has paved
the way for corporations to engage in at least some amount of
philanthropic activity.53 Corporate social responsibility, as this
activity has come to be known,54 is now exceedingly commonplace
and typically takes one of two forms.55 First, corporations use
corporate funds to make charitable contributions.56 These
donations reached a total of $15.29 million in 2010, a full 5
percent of charitable giving in the United States.57 Along the same
lines, corporations often elect to make in-kind contributions of
property or services.58 Corporations choose to make such
donations for several reasons, including to develop a corporate
image and identity of care and giving, to associate a corporate
brand with quality gift recipients, and to improve or influence the
communities where the corporation has a presence.59
Second, companies may “bring consideration of social
impact into the mainstream of their business operations” and
make significant strategic and tactical decisions based in part
upon their impact on social, community, environmental, and
other factors related to the public good.60 Starbucks’s decision to
support rural coffee farmers around the world by committing to
purchase fair trade coffee is one example of this form of
corporate social responsibility.61 These types of supply-chain
decisions may not directly improve the net asset value of a
corporation’s shares (although they could), but they are viewed

53

See generally Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New
Corporate Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351 (2011).
54
See id.
55
Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2446.
56
Id.
57
GIVING USA, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2010:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2011).
58
See Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2447 (“Nor has corporate generosity
been limited to cash donations; an estimated one-third to one-half of corporate giving
takes the form of in-kind contributions.”).
59
Id.; see also Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the
Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of
the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1202-03 (1999).
60
Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2449.
61
Being a Responsible Company, STARBUCKS, http://www.starbucks.com/
responsibility (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
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as a way for powerful and influential corporations to
“spearhead solutions to society’s greatest problems.”62
Corporate social responsibility has traditionally
provided the mechanism by which profit-driven corporations
can engage in philanthropic activities. But notwithstanding the
threat of direct legal challenges that attend corporate decisions
made for reasons other than maximization of shareholder
profits, even comparatively uncontested corporate philanthropy
has its limits.63 First, the discretion to engage in high levels of
philanthropic activity is “powerfully limited by managerial
profit-sharing or stock options, product market competition, the
labor market for corporate officials, the need to raise capital,
the threat of takeovers, and the prospect of being ousted by
shareholder vote.”64 Second, legal limits constrain corporate
philanthropy. For instance, the American Law Institute (ALI)
states that “managers can devote only a ‘reasonable’ amount of
corporate resources to public interest purposes, and can consider
ethical principles only to the extent they are ‘reasonably
regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of
business.’”65 The ALI recommends looking to two factors to
determine reasonableness: (1) decisions “by similar corporations,
and (2) the nexus between the public-spirited activity and the
corporation’s business.”66 Similarly, decisions made pursuant to
state statutes authorizing corporate philanthropic activity
generally permit only reasonable donations.67 As a result of these
constraints, corporate social responsibility is not a perfect
solution for social-enterprise businesses that wish to
aggressively pursue both social good and profits.
D.

The Nonprofit Corporation

The nonprofit corporation, like the corporation, can also
trace its lineage back to ancient times, when most major
religions encouraged communities to care for their less
fortunate and provide for one another in times of need.68 This
commitment to charitable community action through association
62

Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2452.
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 842 (2005).
64
See id. at 840.
65
Id. at 842-43 (citation omitted).
66
Id. at 843 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
67
See id. at 843 n.222 (collecting cases).
68
Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of
America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2440-41 (2005).
63
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evolved into a practicing tradition in America and England,
where governments created organizational forms to serve
charitable activity during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.69 Interestingly, in an early foreshadowing of today’s
entity debate, businesses serving the public good disagreed
about the best entity to serve their needs.70 Originally, the more
common vehicle for charitable activity was the charitable trust.71
But as the charitable trust came under a cloud of skepticism,72
which was one reason among many that the corporation became
the dominant organizational form for charitable and other
philanthropic purposes by the twentieth century.73
Although organizational forms such as the trust are
available for nonprofits, the corporation remains the favored
entity for organizations that are dedicated to serving some
form of public good.74 “[T]he most significant category” of these
corporations “is found at [Internal Revenue] Code section
501(c)(3).”75 While these nonprofit corporations must comply
with a range of statutory requirements, two stand out as most
relevant for this discussion. First, nonprofit organizations
“must be both organized and operated exclusively for one or
more” specified purposes, which include religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, and
prevention of cruelty to children or animals.76 Second, nonprofits
operate under what Professor Hansmann calls the
nondistribution constraint,77 whereby a nonprofit corporation “is
69

Id. at 2451-58.
Id.
71
James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an
Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 625 (1985).
72
Id. at 628 (“For much of the nineteenth century the use of the charitable
trust suffered from widespread fear of the dead hand, particularly the dead hand of the
church, from strict construction of trust statutes, and from judicial unwillingness to
recognize the charitable trust.” (footnote omitted)).
73
Id. at 629-37.
74
“Most nonprofits of any significance are incorporated.” Henry B.
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980). While
“[f]ederal tax exemption law is agnostic among the organizational forms qualifying
charities might take,” Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 17 (2011), this note agrees with Hansmann’s position that the
corporation is the most significant corporate entity. Consequently, this note does not
discuss the other nonprofit forms at any length.
75
I. Richard Gershon, Tax-Exempt Entities: Achieving and Maintaining
Special Status Under the Watchful Eye of the Internal Revenue Service, 16 CUMB. L.
REV. 301, 303 (1986).
76
26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)-(g) (2011).
77
Hansmann, supra note 74, at 838 (“Since a good deal of the discussion that
follows will focus upon this prohibition on the distribution of profits, it will be helpful
to have a term for it; I shall call it the ‘nondistribution constraint.’”). This requirement
70
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barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals
who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors,
or trustees.”78 Generally speaking, these requirements are in
place to ensure that nonprofits are organized to deliver public
(rather than private) benefits and to enforce a nonprofit’s
ongoing commitment to this mission. While the purpose
requirement may not present a problem for social enterprise,
the nondistribution constraint presents a more serious
challenge. As Malani and Posner note, any social enterprise that
prefers a compensation scheme that permits distribution of
profits or equity, rather than a purely salary-based
compensation model, will not organize as a nonprofit.79
E.

The Development of Hybrid Entities

Given these characteristics of for-profit and nonprofit
corporations, social entrepreneurs became increasingly frustrated
with their entity options. If a social-enterprise business were
organized as a corporation, the shareholder primacy theory could
always threaten its publicly oriented activities.80 On the other
hand, if it were organized as a nonprofit corporation, the
nondistribution constraint would deny owners any share of the
business’s earnings, and it could only pursue an exempt purpose.81
As a result, social entrepreneurs attempted to carve a middle path
between the crossroads of for-profit and nonprofit corporations.
Proposed entity forms have not been in short supply. To
date, legal scholars, social business leaders, and legislatures
have offered a spate of potential solutions that purport to make
social enterprise a more attractive business model, to
reconsider the bright-line division between for-profit and
nonprofit businesses, or both.82 In the United States, the most
notable of these entities are the L3C, the B Corporation, and
the statutory benefit corporation.83 While these forms differ in
is embedded within the operation test established in the regulations. 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1.
78
Hansmann, supra note 74, at 838; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1.
79
Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2019.
80
See generally Bisconti, supra note 48.
81
Hansmann, supra note 74, at 838; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1.
82
See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission
Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 105 (2010); see also Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2060.
83
See Part III infra for a detailed discussion on the characteristics of each
entity. For further discussion of these three entities, see Brakman Reiser, supra note
82, at 108-16. Brakman Reiser also notes that the United Kingdom has added the
community interest corporation, which was developed exclusively for the purpose of
serving its growing community of social entrepreneurs. Id. However, as this note
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significant respects84 and their relative virtues are hotly
debated in legal circles,85 each attempts, in its own way, to
create an entity that can: (1) articulate and pursue a dual
mission, (2) gain access to capital, and (3) effectively brand
dual-mission businesses.86
Because these hybrid entities integrate elements of both
for-profit corporations and nonprofit corporations, a question
lingers: should the entities qualify for favorable tax treatment?
The next section begins to address this question by describing
the basic elements of for-profit and nonprofit corporate taxation,
introducing two traditional theories for the distinction between
taxation of for-profit and nonprofit corporations, as well as
Malani and Posner’s recent critique of this distinction.
II.

TAXATION OF FOR-PROFITS AND NONPROFITS

A.

Taxation of the For-Profit Corporation

Generally speaking, the federal government imposes an
annual tax on corporations.87 With several exceptions, corporate
income is taxed like individual income.88 Thus, under section 63
of the Internal Revenue Code, corporations are taxed on their
taxable income, which includes “gross income minus the
deductions allowed by this chapter.”89 Corporations, like
individuals, calculate gross income by including “all income from
whatever source derived.”90 Corporations may then claim
focuses on American tax considerations, it will not provide an analysis of the
community interest corporation.
84
See infra Part III.
85
See generally Brakman Reiser, supra note 82.
86
Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 610.
87
I.R.C. § 11 (2006). S Corporations are a key exception to this general rule.
BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 6.01 (7th ed. 2012). Congress created the S Corporation in order
to “eliminate the influence of the Federal income tax in the selection of the form of
business organization which may be most desirable under the circumstances.” Id. In an
S Corporation, which is subject to certain eligibility requirements, the corporation is
not taxed on its income; rather, the shareholders are taxed personally on the corporate
income even where it is not distributed. Id. Traditional corporate taxation and the S
Corporation exception illustrate a central tension behind corporate tax policy. On the
one hand, the federal government wants to raise revenue by imposing a traditional tax
on corporate activity that produces income. On the other hand, the government is
mindful that the tax system may err when tax consequences distort optimal decisionmaking. This same tension is evident throughout the discussion concerning how to tax
hybrid entities.
88
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 87, ¶ 1.01.
89
I.R.C. § 63.
90
Id. § 61.
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deductions for “most of the items that are taxable to or
deductible by individuals,”91 as well as a number of special
deductions that apply specifically to corporations.92 This taxable
income is then subject to a progressive tax rate with current
top marginal rates of 34-39%.93
B.

Taxation of the Nonprofit Corporation

Nonprofit corporations, by contrast, are exempt from
federal income tax.94 The IRS extends this tax privilege as long
as the corporation meets the requirements for nonprofit
status.95 Nonprofit corporations also receive significant benefits
from section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows
taxpayers to claim a deduction for contributions made to these
businesses.96 But this favorable tax treatment is not without
limits.97 Perhaps most significantly, nonprofit business activities
are subject to the “unrelated business income tax” (UBIT).98 The
UBIT is imposed on “any trade or business” activity that is not
substantially related to the nonprofit’s exempt purposes.99 The
IRS imposes this tax to prevent nonprofits from gaining an
unfair competitive advantage over for-profit businesses by
using tax-exempt income to generate additional earnings in
activities not directly tied to their exempt purposes.100 This
limitation notwithstanding, however, the exemption from
federal tax can provide significant benefits for corporations
that organize as nonprofits.

91

BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 87, ¶ 1.01.
I.R.C. §§ 241-249.
93
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 87, ¶ 1.01.
94
I.R.C. § 501(a).
95
See supra Part I.D; see also I.R.C. § 501.
96
I.R.C. § 170; see also Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2026.
97
Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity
Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 586 (1998).
98
I.R.C. § 513. The IRS also imposes the unrelated debt-financed income tax,
which applies to any property that is not substantially related to the nonprofit’s
exempt purposes and is subject to debt when the nonprofit acquires it. Id. § 514.
99
Id. § 513.
100
26 C.F.R. § 1.513-1 (2012) (“The primary objective of adoption of the
unrelated business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by
placing the unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations upon the
same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which they compete.”); see
also Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities A Subsidy?, 64 TAX L.
REV. 283, 299-300 (2011).
92
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Traditional Rationales for the Distinction

Two common rationales explain why the government
provides distinct tax treatment for nonprofit and for-profit
businesses. The first rationale emerges out of the underlying
principle that the income tax should apply to earnings and be
measured in part by a taxpayer’s ability to pay the tax.101 These
objectives are somewhat difficult to apply to nonprofit
organizations, particularly since these organizations do not
seek profit to the extent that traditional for-profit businesses
do.102 Furthermore, nonprofits have traditionally distributed
most or all of their earnings to beneficiaries through direct
public services or grantmaking, which significantly diminishes
their ability to pay taxes. Thus, taxing nonprofits may simply
be incompatible with major underlying goals of our tax system.
This first principle has animated the tax distinction
between for-profits and nonprofits since the earliest federal tax
bills.103 For instance, the Revenue Act of 1894, one of the
earliest pieces of income-tax legislation, imposed a limited
income tax on traditional profit-driven corporations, while
creating exemptions for “various charitable, religious,
educational, and fraternal benefit organizations.”104 Congressional
debate of the bill suggests that these exemptions were probably
included to prevent taxation of businesses that were not
organized to pursue profits.105 While this bill was later
overturned for constitutional reasons,106 Congress revisited the
topic in the Revenue Act of 1913—the first tax legislation

101

See generally Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of
Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976). While
this note applies Bittker and Rahdert’s theory as articulated, it is important to
acknowledge that others have criticized their view as overly narrow. See, e.g., Barbara
K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative
Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 566-67 (1998) (“[A]s Henry Hansmann
noted, the Bittker and Rahdert thesis failed to encompass the entire universe of
nonprofits. He argued that their thesis omitted nonprofits that derive a substantial
portion of their income not from donations but from goods and services they provide.
Income to these nonprofits is indistinguishable from income derived from proprietary
enterprises in the private sector.” (footnotes omitted)).
102
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 37, at 152.
103
See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 101, at 301.
104
See id. at 302. Two earlier federal income tax laws were passed to support
the Civil War but expired without renewal shortly thereafter. Stephanie Hunter
McMahon, A Law with A Life of Its Own: The Development of the Federal Income Tax
Statutes Through World War I, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 8-17 (2009).
105
See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 101, at 303 (citation omitted).
106
Hunter McMahon, supra note 104, at 26-27.
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initiated after passage of the Sixteenth Amendment.107 As
Congress explored and defined the parameters of its new
taxing power, it continued to treat for-profit and nonprofit
organizations differently by imposing an income tax on forprofit corporations while exempting nonprofits.108 As the bill’s
author stated during debate, “this bill contains the usual
language exempting all corporations of the different kinds
mentioned . . . . Of course any kind of society or corporation that
is not doing business for profit and not acquiring profit would
not come within the meaning of the [applicable] taxing clause.”109
This first rationale continues to exercise intuitive appeal.
The second rationale for the nonprofit income-tax
exemption is the public goods theory, which asserts that these
organizations provide services that the government would
otherwise perform.110 Thus, “the government is compensated for
the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public
funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the
general welfare.”111 Moreover, nonprofits may provide these
socially desirable activities more efficiently than the
government, given that they may be able to respond more
quickly and effectively to needs in the population that they
serve.112 The potential efficiencies of nonprofits provide another
rationale for the government to facilitate nonprofit business
activity by reducing their tax liability.
Some argue that these rationales provide coherent
reasons for the nonprofit tax exemption, while others believe
they result in an unwarranted subsidy to a sizable class of
businesses.113 In either case, it is difficult to ignore that a
107

Passage of the Sixteenth Amendment enabled Congress to pass
comprehensive income tax laws in 1913 and set the tone for the nation’s ongoing tax
system. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 101, at 303.
108
Id.
109
Id. (quoting 50 CONG. REC. 1306 (1913)).
110
Gershon, supra note 75, at 324. There is also a broader view of the public
goods theory, which includes benefits beyond those that the government would
otherwise perform, including “the social norms of trust, cooperation, and reciprocity
that develop through positive citizen interaction and which undergirds the effective
functioning of democracy and a market economy.” Barbara K. Bucholtz, Doing Well by
Doing Good and Vice Versa: Self-Sustaining NGO/Nonprofit Organizations, 17 J.L. & POL’Y
403, 442 n.137 (2009) (quoting Janelle A. Kerlin, Social Enterprise in the United States and
Europe: Understanding and Learning from the Differences, 17 VOLUNTAS: INT’L J.
VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORGS. 247, 258 n.6 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111
Gershon, supra note 75, at 323-24 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. 1939-1 (Part II) C.B. 742).
112
Id. at 324.
113
See Halperin, supra note 100, at 299-300.
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primary effect of the distinction is to reinforce the formalistic
division between for-profits and nonprofits. The IRS and
Congress are intent on ensuring, on the one hand, that
nonprofit tax benefits do not privilege for-profits and, on the
other hand, that nonprofits do not use their tax benefits to
compete with traditional profit-making businesses. So although
social-enterprise businesses may successfully blend nonprofit
and for-profit goals, they must either forego the tax advantages
of the nonprofit or lose the business privileges of the for-profit.
This approach has been subjected to recent criticism that
advocates pushing beyond this binary tax distinction.
D.

Critique of the Current Tax Distinction

Two of the most prominent critics of the current
statutory scheme, Professors Malani and Posner, argue that
the tax code should instead provide tax incentives and
privileges to businesses engaged in activities that promote the
public good, regardless of whether they organize as a nonprofit
business.114 Malani and Posner’s argument advances on four
points. First, they assume that the public goods theory115 is
correct and that the government should provide favorable tax
treatment for activities that eliminate the need for government
action by providing publicly beneficial goods or services.116 But
they reason that this theory supports tax advantages for any
business that provides these services and cannot logically be
restricted to businesses that organize as nonprofits.117 Second,
they argue that the risk of principal–agent costs118 is not
necessarily eliminated by the nonprofit form. Specifically, an
altruistic business manager (the agent) at a publicly oriented
for-profit business may not take advantage of the opportunity
114

See Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2064-65.
See supra Part III.C.
116
Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2030.
117
Id. at 2031.
118
Professor Evelyn Brody concisely explains the nature and consequences of
agency costs:
115

Agency costs are the heart of the maxim: “If you want something done right, you
have to do it yourself.” To an economist, agency costs arise because the agent
simply does not have the same incentives as the principal. Agency costs include,
among other things, the principal’s costs of monitoring the agent (against
misunderstanding, shirking, and even theft), and the agent’s cost of bonding
(such as accepting low initial wages to back up the promised performance).
Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit
and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 462-63 (1996).
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to produce a lower-quality product for his constituents (the
principal); conversely, a business manager at a nonprofit may
reduce product quality to guard against “risk of job loss or to
increase her leisure.”119 Third, they assert that even if tax
breaks for nonprofits encourage reduce the cost of public goods
for downstream public beneficiaries, an exclusive nonprofit
incentive may “crowd out for-profits that produce the
charitable good more cheaply than the nonprofits.”120 As a result,
they argue that the government should use favorable tax
treatment to reward businesses that use for-profit business
structures to provide publicly beneficial goods and service with
improved efficiency. Finally, they posit that even if providing tax
incentives exclusively to nonprofits may protect imperfect
consumers from unscrupulous businesses that distribute
donations improperly,121 fraud laws already offer this protection.122
Malani and Posner’s entity-neutral theory of federal tax
incentives anticipated the rise of social enterprise. At the time
that Malani and Posner developed their theory, hybrid entities
did not exist. Now that the L3C, Benefit Corporation, and
statutory benefit corporation are used more expansively than
ever before, Malani and Posner’s theory can be put to new use.
By applying their analysis to the new classes of hybrid entities,
we can develop a deeper understanding of whether and to what
extent the entities deserve federal tax benefits.

119

Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2035.
Id. at 2045-46. Some scholars have criticized Malani and Posner’s vision of
efficiency as being rather stylized: “Instead of relying on empirical evidence, therefore,
Malani and Posner theorize that for-profits are more efficient than nonprofits because
of intrinsic differences in their compensation schemes.” James R. Hines, Jr. et al., The
Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1193
(2010). Professor Hines notes: “Knowing whether nonprofits are less efficient than forprofits requires evaluating comparable nonprofits and for-profits—those that, among
other things, have the same goals and produce the same goods. Finding comparable
institutions is a notoriously difficult exercise.” Id. While there is value in this critique
of Malani and Posner’s theory, the purpose of this note is to apply Malani and Posner’s
articulation of efficiency to the hybrid entities, withholding any criticism of that theory
for another day.
121
Some theorists argue that the charitable tax exemption is provided
exclusively to nonprofits as “a way to protect the government from imperfect donors.”
Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2050-51. That is, would-be donors to socially
minded businesses who are “insensitive to administrative costs,” including an
organization’s distribution of profits to owners, might make donations to organizations
that shirk on the quality of goods in order to retain more earnings for their owners. Id.
By restricting the charitable deduction to the nonprofit form, the government prevents
donors from making a choice that could produce this inefficient result. Id.
122
Id. at 2051.
120

642

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

III.

APPLYING THE TAX THEORIES TO HYBRID ENTITIES

This note now proceeds to consider how the traditional
theories of nonprofit tax exemption and Malani and Posner’s
broader theory of tax advantages for socially beneficial
activities apply to the hybrid entities. This analysis proceeds in
three stages. First, the note introduces the hybrid entities and
their statutory or structural characteristics relevant to tax
treatment. Second, the analysis applies the traditional theories
to the hybrid entities and determines how extensively the
entities address the policy rationales that generally support
favorable tax treatment. Third, the note applies Malani and
Posner’s theory to the hybrid entities. This portion of the
analysis begins by addressing whether and to what extent the
hybrid entities deliver a public good that eliminates the need
for a government service. It then considers whether and to
what extent the hybrid entities create principal–agent
problems. This section focuses primarily on the enforcement
and regulatory regimes that hybrid entities have adopted to
protect against this issue. It then considers whether these
hybrid entities may be able to provide public goods and services
more efficiently than a traditional nonprofit.123
Through this analysis, the note identifies the statutory
and structural provisions of the new hybrid entities that
support favorable tax treatment. It also discusses the elements
that militate against entity-based tax advantages. Ultimately,
the note concludes that each hybrid entity lacks essential
features that would help justify federal tax benefits.
Nevertheless, the analysis provides a launching point for
hybrid-entity boosters and legislatures who may wish to revise
statutory and structural provisions of their hybrid forms in
order to make a stronger argument for favorable tax treatment.
This conversation is especially salient in light of the recent
federal trend toward minimizing the tax benefits awarded to
nonprofit organizations.124

123

Given that Malani and Posner’s fourth point is merely that fraud law
provides sufficient protection against imperfect consumers in the market to support
businesses creating public goods, see supra Part II.D, it is unnecessary to provide
analysis on this point.
124
Suzanne Perry, Limits on Charity Tax Breaks for Jobs Bill No Longer
Likely, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 7, 2011), http://philanthropy.com/article/Limits-onCharity-Tax-Breaks/129325/.
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The Low-Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C)
1. Entity Structure

The L3C is a variation of the traditional limited liability
company125 and was initially developed for introduction in state
legislatures as a vehicle to channel private foundation
investments into for-profit businesses.126 The form contemplates
a business that is, in the words of its creator Robert Lang,
“going to be paying its own way in this world, but . . . may not
make a lot of money.”127 Like the Limited Liability Company
(LLC) that came before it, the hallmark of the L3C is its
extreme flexibility.128 Consequently, as the form has developed,
its sponsors have found that it may be used to accomplish goals
beyond Lang’s original purpose.129 Perhaps most notably,
scholars have suggested that L3Cs may theoretically take
advantage of tranched investment structures that would
appeal to market investors as well as private foundations.130 As
the oldest of the American hybrid entities, variations of the

125

3

Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L C, History, Basic
Construct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010).
126
3
Id. (“When I first conceived of the L C, I had a more limited concept in
mind than I have now. It was totally concentrated on finding a way to allow
foundations to make investments into socially beneficial activities more efficiently and
in partnership with commercial investment by creating a vehicle that would encourage
foundations to do so.”).
127
Id.
128
Robert R. Keatinge, LLCs and Nonprofit Organizations—For-Profits,
Nonprofits, and Hybrids, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 553, 582 (2009).
129
See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended
Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 628 (2010).
130
As Professor Brakman Reiser explains:
An equity tranche of members could be tax-exempt private foundations making
program-related investments. Because the PRI regulations specifically bar
foundations from contemplating a financial return as a motive for investment,
this tranche of members would be given scant or very remote rights to
distributions. A mezzanine tranche of individuals or entities could purchase L3C
memberships as a type of socially-responsible investment. This tranche of
investors would agree to operating agreement terms that provided them with
some access to distributions, but at a rate lower than market return, presumably
doing so in return for the social or psychic value produced by the entity. The
L3C’s operating agreement could then provide for a market-like return to a
senior tranche of individuals and entities seeking such returns, presumably
doing so in competition with other market-rate investment opportunities. The
structure of these provisions might be more debt-like or equity-like (though if the
latter, more like preferred than common stock), providing either a guaranteed
return or a return keyed to the L3C’s profits.
Id. (footnote omitted).

644

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

L3C have been adopted in nine states and one Indian Territory,
with 658 businesses operating as L3Cs.131
Today, L3Cs do indeed blend aspects of traditionally
profit-making organizations with historically public-oriented
organizations. On the one hand, a typical statute authorizing
the L3C132 resembles a nonprofit corporation. First, the L3C
must be organized to further “the accomplishment of one or
more charitable or educational purposes,”133 and second, “the
production of income or the appreciation of property” cannot be
a “significant purpose of the company.”134 On the other hand,
and in some tension with the foregoing rule, L3C’s are permitted
to “produce[] significant income or capital appreciation” if not a
“significant purpose of the company.”135 Similarly, and perhaps
more significantly, an L3C is not bound by the distribution
constraint, and the statutes envision that the business will
distribute profits to some or all of its members.136 Finally, “L3C
status appears to be neither a permanent nor a publicly
guarded designation,” which means that there is little to
ensure that a business organized under the L3C label will
enforce the dual mission it was founded to achieve.137 If the
business changes course, it will simply lose its L3C designation
and generally become an LLC.138
In this discussion, the L3C is unique for its tax structure.
As a subset of the LLC, the L3C is taxed as an LLC.139 As a
result, its members may elect that the entity be taxed as a
partnership or as a corporation. If taxed as a partnership, the
L3C itself is not taxed at the organizational level.140 Rather, its
earnings are taxed only after they are distributed and claimed
as earnings by its members.141 If taxed as a corporation, then the

131

Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, http://www.intersectorl3c.com/
l3c_tally.html (last visited on Oct. 10, 2012).
132
This section will emphasize Vermont’s L3C statutory regime because it
was the first of its kind and provides a useful benchmark. Other states’ L3C statutes
are substantially similar. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2011); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 450.4102 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15102(a)(ix) (2011).
133
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (2011).
134
Id. § 3001(27)(B).
135
Id.
136
Brakman Reiser, supra note 82, at 108-09.
137
Brakman Reiser, supra note 129, at 629.
138
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(D).
139
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5920-5921 (2006).
140
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 17:2 (West 2012).
141
Id.
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L3C is subject to the typical for-profit corporate tax regime.142 An
L3C may even elect to become a tax-exempt nonprofit
organization, provided that it meets the statutory requirements
of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.143
2. Tax Benefits Under the Traditional Theories
The L3C illustrates that the nature of hybrid entities—
borrowing aspects from traditional for-profit and nonprofit
organizations—creates both vices and virtues under traditional
tax theory. Regarding its vices, the L3C is generally organized
to produce earned income, some of which it will retain or
distribute to members and owners.144 As discussed, generating
profits is one of the two goals of a dual-mission organization,
and L3Cs attempt to realize this goal by, among other tactics,
touting the potential for tranched investments in L3C
businesses. As such, taxing the entity does not violate
traditional tax principles of taxing earned income and profits.
Rather, it would be incongruous with traditional tax policy and
would create horizontal inequities between L3Cs and typical
LLCs if the IRS were to impose tax on the latter while creating
favorable tax conditions for the former. Similarly, the L3C has
an ability to pay taxes to the extent that it distributes its
earnings to owners rather than to public constituents. Thus,
the entity has income that appears fairly measurable, and it
should have the resources necessary to pay its taxes. At first
blush, it does not appear inappropriate to tax the L3C.
As to its virtues, the L3C’s statutory provisions expressly
require that businesses adopting the entity must be organized to
accomplish one of the charitable purposes the IRS has outlined
under section 501(c)(3).145 As such, an L3C business will
necessarily operate to pursue one of the goals that the IRS has
singled out for favorable treatment. This suggests that L3Cs will
eliminate at least some need for services that the government
might otherwise need to provide—the second traditional rationale
for distinct tax treatment. But an L3C is not required to pursue
these purposes exclusively, which creates some uncertainty about
the level of government services an L3C business would replace.
142

Id. at § 17:22; see also supra Part II.A.
IRS, LLC GUIDE SHEET, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
llc_guide_sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
144
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B) (2006).
145
See, e.g., id. § 3001(27)(A).
143
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Regarding efficiency, L3Cs will almost surely have the potential
to deliver their services more efficiently than the government—
and for the same reasons that nonprofits offer an efficient
alternative. In particular, L3Cs operate within their communities
and have a strong incentive to respond quickly to their
constituencies’ needs. The L3C’s statutory prohibition against
producing significant profits as a primary purpose of the business
should help ensure that L3Cs remain committed to producing
more and better goods or services for their constituents and that
they seek additional income for their owners only as a secondary
consideration.146 As such, the L3C does include some
characteristics that support favorable tax treatment under the
traditional tax theories.
3. Tax Benefits Under Malani and Posner
L3Cs have a stronger argument for tax incentives under
Malani and Posner’s theory than under the traditional tax
theories—but it is still insufficient to justify favorable tax
treatment. Under the first and most important element of this
theory, L3Cs will eliminate the need for some government
services. The fact that an L3C’s purposes are statutorily
constrained and must address one of the charitable purposes
approved under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code
ensures that the primary activities of L3Cs will fully overlap
with the primary activities of exempt nonprofits. Thus, the
structure of the L3C directs these businesses to produce some
form of the public goods and services that the government
might otherwise have to provide. That L3Cs may also go on to
pursue additional objectives—including the production of
distributable income—is perfectly acceptable under Malani and
Posner’s theory. Indeed, this theory does not require that a
business pursue such public goods to the exclusion of all other
activities. Relieving the government of some burden is
sufficient to warrant favorable tax treatment under this theory.

146

See John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A
Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 141
(2010). Tyler argues that the L3C structure is in fact sufficient to ensure that the
profit-making motive is subordinate to the public purpose. Id. (“[A]t the highest levels,
the theory and purposes of the L3C prioritize charitable, exempt purposes as a
fiduciary matter. Moreover, characterizing the L3C as ‘for-profit’ does not refer to the
firm’s objective, as is the case under normal circumstances for other forms, but instead
most properly acknowledges legal permission to earn and distribute profits. . . . Given
its purposes, it is probably more appropriate to refer to L3Cs as ‘for-charity’ . . . .”).

2013]

TAX ANALYSIS OF HYBRID ENTITIES

647

Under the theory’s second element, however, the L3C
may create principal–agent problems that militate against
favorable tax treatment. First, the statutory provision against
making the production of profit a primary purpose will
probably limit—but does not eliminate—the incentive for L3C
managers to shirk on quality in favor of distributable profits. If
the potential for substantial profits is sufficiently high and the
L3C can earn them without alienating its constituencies—
namely, beneficiaries, employees, members, and creditors—then
there would be little incentive not to pursue the profits. Second,
the absence of a meaningful penalty on an L3C business or
manager for deviating from its primary purpose only exacerbates
the risk of entity departure.147 While an L3C may lose its
designation, this outcome is probably of relatively little
consequence to a business that has determined it can earn more
significant profits without the designation. Third, L3Cs are
organized under the laws governing LLCs and, consequently,
their activities are not subject to the federal regulatory scrutiny
that polices nonprofits.148 The IRS does not have authority to
monitor whether the L3C complies with its state-law entity
requirements. While state attorneys general have authority to
review the conduct of businesses organized within the state,149
L3Cs would presumably fall between the regulatory cracks, given
that an L3C’s deviation from purpose would likely register as a
low priority on the list of traditional business malfeasance that
attorneys general prosecute.150 Moreover, the charities bureaus of
the attorneys general are notoriously overburdened and
underresourced, which suggests that they would not have the
capacity to effectively regulate L3Cs’ adherence to statutory
purposes—even if they had that authority.151 Finally, it is unclear
precisely to what extent a regulator should enforce an L3C’s
commitment to purpose. Businesses utilizing the L3C may value
the statutory characteristics that appear to permit such a free
transition between the L3C and LLC designations. Thus, L3Cs do
147

See Brakman Reiser, supra note 129, at 629. For a competing view, see
Tyler, supra note 146, at 141.
148
Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2463 (noting this issue in the context of
a pure for-profit philanthropist); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A).
149
See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State
Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 946 (2004).
150
Indeed, as Professor Brakman Reiser points out, Illinois is the only
jurisdiction to treat “L3C managers . . . as charitable trustees” whose adherence to a
business’s approved statutory purpose is monitored by the state attorney general.
Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 616 n.132.
151
Brakman Reiser, supra note 23, at 2464; see also Brody, supra note 149, at 947.
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not warrant favorable tax treatment under the second factor in
Malani and Posner’s theory.
L3Cs address the third aspect of Malani and Posner’s
theory directly by providing public goods more efficiently than
a nonprofit. First, the statutory language expressly permitting
L3Cs to “[produce] significant income or capital appreciation”
as long as it is not a “significant purpose of the company” is
designed to allow a measure of pure profitability that is simply
unavailable to nonprofits.152 This flexibility becomes especially
important in light of the fact that L3Cs are permitted to
distribute some portion of their earnings to owners.153 The
combination of these two structural elements may lead to
additional organizational efficiencies: as L3C managers seek to
deliver their public goods in the most efficient way possible, they
may generate more profits to distribute to owners, thereby
achieving the dual-mission ideal. Moreover, an L3C may access
traditional market tools for amassing capital—such as equityinvestment instruments unrelated to the L3C purpose—that are
unavailable to nonprofits.154 Not only may the L3C invest its own
funds in more ways than a nonprofit, but it may theoretically
gain access to a larger market of investors who wish to see a
return on investments—a return that nonprofits are prohibited
from giving.155 While the size and strength of such a market is
the subject of much debate, the L3C’s statutory structure
nonetheless creates access to whatever market is available.156
Consequently, L3Cs have efficiency benefits that nonprofits do
not. Because providing an exclusive tax benefit to nonprofits
ignores these benefits, L3Cs warrant favorable tax treatment
under the last factor in Malani and Posner’s theory.
4. Conclusions
In light of this analysis, there are persuasive reasons to
provide L3Cs favorable tax treatment. The L3C statutory
structure ensures that businesses operating as L3Cs will offer
some goods and services that the government would otherwise
provide. Moreover, L3Cs have the potential to do so more
efficiently than both the government and—at least in some
152

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.513-1 (2012);
Hansmann, supra note 74, at 838.
153
See Brakman Reiser, supra note 82, at 108-09.
154
I.R.C. § 513 (2006).
155
Id.
156
Brakman Reiser, supra note 82, at 108-09.
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instances—nonprofits. But the L3C faces a significant hurdle in
receiving favorable tax treatment since its lack of a strong
regulatory framework creates the potential for principal–agent
problems that could result in tax abuse. That is, without rigorous
monitoring of a business’s commitment to purpose, L3Cs may take
advantage of tax benefits designed to incentivize that purpose but
ultimately elect to pursue pure profits rather than public benefits.
Given the scarcity of resources available for mission enforcement,
it is unlikely that the federal government or local governments
will be able to take this step alone. Consequently, the L3C does
not qualify for favorable tax treatment under either the traditional
theories or Malani and Posner’s theory.
B.

The B Corporation
1. Entity Structure

By contrast to L3Cs, B Lab developed the B Corporation
as an independent business mark that “us[es] the power of
business to solve social and environmental problems.”157 B Lab, a
nonprofit corporation, is committed to using the B Corporation
to develop a community of businesses that aspire “to address
society’s greatest challenges” by “harness[ing] the power of
private enterprise to create public benefit.”158 B Lab envisions
achieving this goal by requiring its businesses to meet “higher
standards of transparency, accountability, and performance.”159
Unlike L3Cs (and traditional business entities), B Corporations
do not carry a legal distinction, and any business may apply to
become a certified B Corporation, regardless of its entity.160 B
Lab began certifying B Corporations in 2006,161 and more than
600 businesses currently operate under its mark.162
B Corporations blend traditional for-profit and nonprofit
forms in two key ways. First, the B Corporation mark is open
to all businesses, including all varieties of traditional for-profit
157

The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/whatare-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
158
Why B Corps Matter, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/why-b-corps-matter (last visited Oct. 15, 2012); The B Corp Declaration, B LAB,
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-b-corp-declaration (last visited Oct.
15, 2012).
159
Why B Corps Matter, supra note 158.
160
Steven J. Haymore, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B Corporations and the
Delaware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311, 1313-14 (2011).
161
Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 594.
162
Founding B Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/community/
founding-b-corps (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
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entities. But this freedom to embrace entities that support
profit-making is tempered by purpose limitations that B Lab
imposes through its certification process, which the company
enforces with an auditing procedure. The certification process
requires businesses to satisfy three requirements. The applicant
must: (1) pass a scored impact assessment on its commitment to
social good, (2) “amend[] its articles of incorporation and other
governing documents” to “institutionalize its [social] commitment,”
and (3) submit reporting documents and fees to B Lab, which
audits the businesses.163 The impact assessment—which has been
continuously revised—is developed by an independent Standards
Advisory Council tasked with developing rigorous standards for
social and environmental performance.164 Once a business passes
the threshold score on the impact assessment, B Lab verifies its
responses by reviewing documentation for a portion of the
applicant’s responses.165 Then, B Lab conducts random annual
audits of B Corporations to ensure that they comply with the
required commitments.166 Currently, B Lab conducts audits on 20%
of its membership every two years.167
2. Tax Benefits Under the Traditional Theories
Under the traditional theories, B Corporations face
immediate obstacles to favorable tax treatment. First, B
Corporations are not legally recognized entities and,
consequently, the government may be skeptical of awarding
favorable tax treatment merely by virtue of a business’s
association with B Lab, regardless of how laudable its goals
may be. That said, the absence of a legally recognized status is
not fatal to B Corporations’ claim to favorable tax treatment,
given that the government sometimes awards favorable tax

163

Haymore, supra note 160, at 1321.
B
LAB,
TERM
SHEET
FOR
B
CORPORATIONS,
available
at
http://www.bcorporation.net/storage/documents/term_sheet_non-constituencybenefit.pdf
(last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
165
How to Become a B Corp, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-bcorp/how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). B Lab also helps businesses comply
with the second requirement by providing basic step-by-step instructions on how to amend its
governing documents; obtain approval of the amendments from the business’s governing body;
obtain approval of the amendments from shareholders, members, or partners; and, where
necessary, file its amended articles. Legal Roadmap, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/
become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/1057-legal-roadmap (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
166
Haymore, supra note 160, at 1321.
167
Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 602.
164
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treatment based on a third-party designation.168 Second, typical
for-profit businesses can be certified as B Corporations. When
they are, these businesses would be able to pursue profit much
as ordinary for-profits. As a result, it would be appropriate to
tax that profit. Indeed, awarding favorable tax treatment only
to B Corporations but not traditional for-profit corporations
would create an acute horizontal equity concern. Moreover, forprofit B Corporations have the ability to pay the income tax on
their earnings, which avoids the liquidity problems that burden
nonprofits. Third, and perhaps most problematically, B Lab
certification does not ensure that B Corporations will provide
public goods or services that the government would otherwise
provide. To begin with, while B Lab’s impact assessment includes
a purpose requirement, the parameters and even the necessity of
this purpose requirement are not articulated with sufficient
clarity or rigor.169 For instance, the impact assessment merely
inquires as to whether a business’s “products or services are
specifically designed to address an economic inequality, improve
health, [or] promote the arts/sciences/media.”170 In addition to
these permitted purposes, which bear some resemblance to the
government-supported purposes under section 501(c)(3), B Lab
also allows B Corporations to satisfy this requirement if they
“drive capital to purpose-driven enterprises.”171 This allows
businesses to qualify for the entity designation with an unusually
broad list of activities.172 For example, as long as a business shows
that it serves a high percentage of “poor or very poor”
constituents,173 it may satisfy the purpose requirement by offering
such services as “sustainability consulting,” making products
that “promote healthy living,” or “[c]reat[ing] . . . empowerment
opportunities.”174 Under B Lab’s broad purpose standards, a
business that sells yoga mats to out-of-work actors could
conceivably qualify as a B Corporation. Therefore, B
Corporations cannot guarantee that they relieve the government
of the need to provide public goods or services. In light of the
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An example discussed at some length is LEED certification, infra at Part
IV.B.3. See Eileen D. Millett, Green Building for Dummies: What Is a LEED
Certification?, PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Jan. 2009, at 41, 45.
169
Impact Assessment, SE1.1, B LAB, https://b-lab.secure.force.com/bcorp/
ImpactAssessment?id=a03C000000AYgPpIAL (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
170
Id.
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Id.
172
See id. at SE3.1.
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Id. at SE11.7.
174
Id. at SE3.1.
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foregoing, B Corporations do not qualify for favorable tax
treatment under the traditional tax theories.
3. Tax Benefits Under Malani and Posner
B Corporations face the same hurdle to favorable tax
treatment under Malani and Posner’s first point as they do
under the traditional tax theory. That is, B Corporations cannot
demonstrate that they will provide a public good that the
government would otherwise have to provide.175 Indeed, B Lab’s
broad purpose requirements relate more to the company’s
subjective and somewhat amorphous notion of positive
community purpose rather than to an objective set of purposes
that would relieve the government of its need to make costly
social investments. Accordingly, B Corporations do not qualify
for favorable tax treatment under Malani and Posner’s first
consideration.
Nevertheless, B Corporations make an important
advance over L3Cs under the principal–agent point of Malani
and Posner’s theory. Whereas L3Cs operate in a regulatory
gray area—with no one to ensure that businesses adhere to the
purpose requirements articulated under the statute—B
Corporations are independently regulated by B Lab.176 B Lab’s
commitment to initial certification and its responsibility for
ongoing monitoring of all companies that bear its mark offer an
intriguing solution to the difficulties of regulating potential tax
advantages that would accrue to organizations based on entity
type. Indeed, in a similar context, some scholars have argued
that independent approaches to enforcing nonprofit law may be
more successful than traditional lawmaking.177
In theory, at least, B Lab plays much the same role for
B Corporations that state attorneys general play for
nonprofits—ensuring that an applicant business qualifies for
the favorable mark, enforcing purpose requirements, and
stripping a business of its privileged entity status and
175

See supra Part III.B.2.
Haymore, supra note 160, at 1321.
177
See, e.g., Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the
Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (2007) (“This Article argues
that because of the incorporation habits of nonprofit corporations, coupled with the
limited governmental resources devoted to the development and enforcement of
nonprofit state law, private lawmaking initiatives-independent from government
control-provide the primary means for achieving uniformity and reform of nonprofit
law. As a result, these private lawmaking projects have even more influence and
importance than similar projects affecting other fields of law.”).
176
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hypothetical tax advantages where it fails to meet its
obligations. B Lab could relieve the federal government of
much of its regulatory role without burdening state regulators,
who are already overextended in their regulation of nonprofits.
There may be some concern that B Lab’s audit lottery, which
promises to audit only 10% of B Corporations annually, is
inadequate to ensure that B Corporations do not deviate from
their purpose after taking advantage of related tax benefits. This,
however, is ten times the rate that the IRS currently audits
taxpayers.178 As such, B Lab’s regulation of B Corporations has
the potential to be more effective than the current federal
regulation of nonprofits. B Lab’s system also compares favorably
to other successful, independent regulatory systems such as
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)
certification. As such, the government might look to LEED as a
model for how to treat B Lab and B Corporations.179
Finally, under the third factor of Malani and Posner’s
theory, B Corporations cannot necessarily produce goods and
services more efficiently than traditional nonprofits. Indeed, a
B Corporation may be a traditional nonprofit that has merely
grafted the B Corporation designation onto its business. In this
sense, a B Corporation would not possess any efficiency
advantage over traditional nonprofits but would already
qualify for favorable tax treatment. Conversely, a B
Corporation may be a traditional for-profit corporation that has
a significant efficiency advantage but has committed only to
loose social ideas rather than more objectively valuable social
purposes. In this scenario, the efficiency gains become moot
178

Tax Cheater Warning: Odds Are Against You, SEATTLE TAX LAW. (Oct. 25,
2011), http://www.seattletaxlawyers.org/index.php/tag/audit-lottery/.
179
LEED is a “nationally accepted third-party certification program” that
rates and certifies building projects according to independently developed
sustainability standards. Anika E. Leerssen, Smart Growth and Green Building: An
Effective Partnership to Significantly Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 26 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 287, 313 n.138 (2011). A building’s LEED certifications are, in turn, the
qualifying criteria for favorable tax consequences. At this time, B Lab does not have the
national recognition of LEED certification. But the organization appears intent on
continuing to develop its certification systems and working with governments to ensure
its viability. Passing Legislation, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/legislation (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). This commitment to work with governments
augurs well for its potential to become a third party whose certification could trigger tax
advantages. In addition, in both B Lab and LEED certification, companies must pay for
the costs of certification and monitoring. Leerssen, supra, at 313 n.138. Consequently,
governments need not incur the expense and businesses will only pursue the designation
where it is strategically compelling, financially advantageous, or both. Furthermore, B
Lab, like LEED, is a nonprofit organization, which should help to ensure that the expense
of certification and monitoring is closely related to its cost. Id.
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because the government would have little interest in
encouraging efficiencies that do not redound to the public good
and reduce government spending. As such, the B Corporation’s
ambivalence to entity form is an impediment to granting
favorable tax treatment based upon the entity designation.
4. Conclusions
The challenges that B Corporations face in receiving
favorable tax treatment can be viewed as an inverse of the
L3C. On the one hand, the B Corporation purpose requirements
do not have the clarity or objective value of the L3C. L3C
statutes have been tightly constructed and require businesses
using the mark to serve the approved nonprofit purposes the
IRS has outlined. By contrast, B Lab’s certification process
utilizes a somewhat ponderous survey and approves an overly
broad set of purposes that are largely subjective and bear little
relation to purposes that the government encourages with
favorable tax treatment. On the other hand, B Lab’s
independent-certification and regulation model is a desirable
alternative to the absence of any meaningful regulation of L3Cs.
B Lab’s regulatory structure addresses significant principal–
agent concerns without burdening the government with
administrative cost or complexity. With a successful working
model like LEED certification to draw upon, a commitment to
adopt successful regulatory practices, and its own funding
stream, B Lab may be able to provide a successful system for
policing B Corporations. But this regulatory advance will be of
little use in securing tax advantages for B Corporations unless B
Lab formulates a tighter set of purpose requirements and
limits its designation to a defined entity type. Accordingly, at
this stage in its development, the B Corporation does not
qualify for favorable tax treatment under either the traditional
theories or Malani and Posner’s theory.
C.

The Statutory Benefit Corporation
1. Entity Structure

B Lab’s creation has also begun to influence state
legislatures, leading to the third hybrid entity option: the
statutory benefit corporation. In 2010, Maryland established the
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first statutory benefit corporation,180 which is closely “modeled on
B Lab’s concept.”181 Since that time, Vermont, New Jersey,
Virginia, Hawaii, California, and New York have all adopted their
own versions of enabling legislation that allow businesses to
become statutory benefit corporations.182 These benefit corporations
are a “state-sanctioned” form that requires interested businesses to
obtain “private certification” of commitments to social value that
closely track the three original B Lab requirements.183 While the
various state versions of the benefit corporation differ in some
respects, they share a common core structure.184 As of this writing,
there are few reliable statistics on how many businesses are
operating as statutory benefit corporations.
There are three key structural elements of statutory
benefit corporations. First, each statute attempts to free
businesses operating as benefit corporations from conflicts with
shareholder primacy by incorporating language permitting the
corporation to consider the interests of several constituencies
without prioritizing shareholders.185 The statutes also expressly
state that consideration of these other constituencies will not
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.186 Second, the statutes
require that businesses applying for the designation serve one
of several publicly oriented purposes.187 But the purpose
requirements articulated in each of the statutes are more akin
to the broad range of standards acceptable under the B
Corporation’s certification process than to the narrower set of
purposes approved by the IRS for nonprofit status. Acceptable
purposes include:
[(1)] Providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities
with beneficial products or services; [(2)] Promoting economic
180

Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation,
CSRWIRE (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-MarylandFirst-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation.
181
Brakman Reiser, supra note 74, at 39; see also Brakman Reiser, supra note
25, at 594.
182
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1832 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-38-110
to -600 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21
(2011); see also Judy Molland, Care2 Success! New York Establishes Benefit
Corporations, CARE2 (Dec. 18, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.care2.com/causes/care2success-new-york-establishes-benefit-corporations.html.
183
Brakman Reiser, supra note 74, at 39; see also MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (2011).
184
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1832; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-38-110 to
-600; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.
185
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09.
186
See, e.g., id. § 21.11.
187
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1832; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-38-110 to
-600; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.
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opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs
in the normal course of business; [(3)] Preserving or improving the
environment; [(4)] Improving human health; [(5)] Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement of knowledge; [(6)] Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a public benefit purpose; and [(7)] Conferring
any other particular benefit on society or the environment.188

Third, the statutes require businesses to secure approval from
a third party that has:
a recognized standard for defining, reporting, and assessing corporate
social and environmental performance that: [(1)] Is developed by a
person that is independent of the benefit corporation; and [(2)] Is
transparent because the following information about the standard is
publicly available: [(a)] The factors considered when measuring the
performance of a business; [(b)] The relative weightings of those factors;
and [(c)] The identity of the persons that develop and control changes to
the standard and the process by which those changes are made.189

While none of the statutes state so explicitly, this provision
appears to relate directly to B Lab’s lobbying efforts. In fact, the
rise of the statutory benefit corporation in general is most likely
the product of B Lab and its boosters, who have directed
significant efforts toward passing each piece of enabling
legislation.190 Consequently, benefit corporations in statutory form
bear close resemblance to B Corporations. Finally, as the name
might imply, statutory benefit corporations are corporations that
must meet both the ordinary formation and operational
requirements of for-profit corporations, with the exception of the
variations described above.191
2. Tax Benefits Under the Traditional Theories
The traditional rationales that support favorable tax
treatment for nonprofit corporations do not offer strong support
for providing similar tax treatment to the statutory benefit
corporation. First, taxing statutory benefit corporations is not
fundamentally at odds with the goals of the tax system. As
with both L3Cs and B Corporations, statutory benefit
corporations contemplate earning some profit. It is appropriate
to tax the corporations on those profits. Moreover, unlike L3Cs,
188

VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; accord LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1803(A)(10); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(7); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(6).
189
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; accord LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1803(A)(12); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(9); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(8).
190
Passing Legislation, supra note 179.
191
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1802(C); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(B);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-784; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.02(a).
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statutory benefit corporations are not restricted to earning only a
marginal level of profits. Rather, they may pursue significant
profits as long as they also maintain their commitment to the
broad purposes outlined by statute. Accordingly, statutory
benefit corporations should be able to pay income taxes imposed
on their earnings. Unlike B Corporations, statutory benefit
corporations are legally recognized entities that individual states
have sanctioned. But this characteristic is not alone sufficient to
warrant favorable tax treatment under the traditional theory.
Second, it is unclear to what extent statutory benefit
corporations will provide goods and services that the
government would otherwise need to provide. While the
purpose requirements articulate some goals that closely track
the IRS’s approved purposes for nonprofit exemption, the
statutes go on to broaden the scope of permissible purposes by
including “[c]onferring any other particular benefit on society
or the environment” as an acceptable purpose.192 This catchall
purpose mirrors the expansive purposes that B Lab approves;
it does little to ensure that businesses operating as statutory
benefit corporations will pursue one of the narrow classes of
activities that the government wishes to encourage with
favorable tax treatment. In this regard, the enabling legislation
is well drafted to funnel statutory benefit corporations into the
B Lab fold, but it is poorly designed to justify favorable tax
treatment on the basis of the entity.
3. Tax Benefits Under Malani and Posner
As discussed above, the enabling statutes fail to
effectively ensure that statutory benefit corporations will
produce goods and services that the government might
otherwise need to provide. Considering the statutory language
more deeply will help to illustrate this point. To begin with,
even those statutory-benefit-corporation purposes that track
the accepted IRS purposes tend to expand the acceptable range
of activity beyond what the government generally encourages
with favorable tax treatment. For instance, “Promoting the
arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge” parallels the
government’s accepted scientific, educational, and literary
purposes. But the expanded statutory purpose includes the
vague “advancement of knowledge” term, which broadens the
192

VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; see also, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1832; S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(7)(g); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.02(a); I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2011).
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scope of the purpose beyond what might ensure the provision of
services the government would otherwise have to provide.193
Similarly, the purpose of “[p]roviding low-income or underserved
individuals or communities with beneficial products or services”
tracks the accepted IRS charitable purpose but includes the
overly broad term “beneficial products or services,” which is too
vague and overinclusive to meet Malani and Posner’s first
consideration.194 The remaining list of approved statutory-benefitcorporation purposes reflects broad social and environmental
ideals that the government does not systemically encourage with
favorable tax benefits.195 Consequently, the statutory benefit
corporation does not warrant favorable tax treatment under
Malani and Posner’s first consideration.
In an attempt to address Malani and Posner’s second
concern, the statutory benefit corporation, like the B
Corporation, attempts to address principal–agent problems by
formally assigning regulatory responsibilities to independent
third parties. As discussed above, this system has the potential
to provide an efficient regulatory regime by significantly
reducing government’s role in regulation, causing businesses to
internalize most certification and monitoring costs, and assuring
that statutory benefit corporations adhere to a set of approved
purposes. Given B Lab’s desire to serve as a major third-party
regulator, its growing capacity, and its work with state
legislatures, it is possible that B Lab will be able to effectively
perform this regulatory function. But it is likely that other thirdparty standard setters may enter the market to certify and
monitor statutory benefit corporations, as well. Given the
relative ease with which companies can meet the statutory
requirements and become third-party regulators, it is by no
means certain that every regulator will adequately fulfill its
role and effectively monitor statutory benefit corporations.196 To
193

VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1803(A)(10)(e);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(7)(e); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(6)(E); see also
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
194
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1803(A)(10)(a);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-130(A)(7)(a); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(6)(A); see also
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
195
To reiterate, these include “[p]romoting economic opportunity for
individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of
business; . . . [p]reserving or improving the environment; . . . [i]mproving human
health; . . . [i]ncreasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose;
and . . . [c]onferring any other particular benefit on society or the environment.” VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-782; accord LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1803(A)(10); S.C. CODE ANN. § 3338-130(A)(7); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(6).
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See Brakman Reiser, supra note 25, at 601.
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the extent that third parties fall short in their regulatory role,
there is a risk that their certifications will create a public
impression that businesses meet an objective set of favorable
criteria without ensuring that they actually do—leading to the
very principal–agent problems that the nonprofit designation
and IRS enforcement do much to avoid.
Although hardly dispositive as to whether statutory
benefit corporations should qualify for favorable tax treatment
under Malani and Posner’s theory, these corporations are likely
to produce public goods and services more efficiently than
nonprofits. As with both the L3C and B Corporations, statutory
benefit corporations have access to streams of capital that are not
available to nonprofits. This theoretically allows businesses
operating under this entity to make the most efficient use of
market resources when pursuing their purposes. Furthermore,
statutory benefit corporations’ ability to distribute some earnings
to owners creates a strong incentive to maximize organizational
efficiency in order to increase income for shareholders. As with
L3Cs, these efficiency gains may be tempered by the requirement
that statutory benefit corporations adhere to the purpose
requirements as set forth by statute and monitored by thirdparty regulators. That said, this potential drag on efficiency is
not sufficient to militate against favorable tax treatment under
the third consideration of Malani and Posner’s theory.
4. Conclusions
As with both the L3C and B Corporation, the statutory
benefit corporation makes an incomplete argument for favorable
tax treatment. Under the traditional theory, the entity does not
warrant tax advantages because businesses operating under the
designation will produce some profit and may not eliminate the
need for government services. Under Malani and Posner’s
theory, the statutory benefit corporation warrants tax
advantages because of its potential to produce goods and
services more efficiently than traditional nonprofits and its
independent regulatory solution to potential principal–agent
problems. As with B Corporations, however, the enabling
legislation creates an overly broad set of purposes, which allows
statutory benefit corporations to pursue a range of activities far
beyond those that would limit the need for government services.
Consequently, this entity lacks the essential ingredient necessary
for the government to encourage its activities with favorable tax
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treatment—and the essential ingredient for support under
Malani and Posner’s theory.
CONCLUSION
As hybrid entities begin to erode the hard-edged
divisions between for-profit and nonprofit entity types, it is
instructive to consider how they might similarly blur traditional
notions of for-profit and nonprofit taxation. The foregoing note is
an attempt to develop this discussion by applying three tax
theories to existing hybrid entities: two traditional theories that
support nonprofit tax exemption, and Malani and Posner’s more
recent theory that argues for a broader system of tax advantages
for businesses producing social benefits. Under the traditional
theories of favorable tax treatment for nonprofits—which share
the hybrid entities’ goal to produce socially valuable goods and
services—the hybrid entities’ profit production and distribution
imposes a serious challenge to favorable tax treatment. Under
Malani and Posner’s theory, the hybrid entities make a
stronger—albeit unsuccessful—case for favorable tax treatment.
L3Cs lack the regulatory structures to enforce their socially
valuable purposes. B Corporations and statutory benefit
corporations fail to outline a sufficiently rigorous set of business
purposes to ensure that they would relieve the government of
services it would otherwise need to perform. Accordingly, none of
the hybrid entities currently warrant favorable tax treatment.
Moving forward, social entrepreneurs and legislators
engaged in the discussion on hybrid entities would be well
advised to consider synthesizing elements of each hybrid entity
in order to present a stronger argument for favorable tax
treatment. Combining the L3C’s narrow set of approved
purposes, the B Corporation’s independent regulatory
framework, and the statutory benefit corporation’s form would
produce an entity that could limit the need for government
services, reduce principal–agent concerns, and produce goods
and services more efficiently than traditional nonprofits. Such
an entity would represent a valuable addition to the spectrum of
hybrid entities and would make a strong case for tax
advantages. Until this occurs, businesses like Seventh
Generation should continue to test traditional tax boundaries
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and push tax law to keep pace with today’s new generation of
hybrid businesses and entities.
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